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iFOREWORD: The Air-Sea Battle Concept
From its inception, the U.S. military has continuously adapted itself to meet evolving threats. At its core, the Air-
Sea Battle (ASB) Concept is about reducing risk and maintaining U.S. freedom of action and reflects the Services’ 
most recent efforts to improve U.S. capabilities. Similar to previous efforts, the Concept seeks to better integrate 
the Services in new and creative ways. It is a natural and deliberate evolution of U.S. power projection and a key 
support component of U.S. national security strategy for the 21st century.
AirLand Battle was developed in the 1970s and 1980s to counter a Soviet backed combined arms attack in Europe. 
A key component of AirLand Battle was the degradation of rear echelon forces before they could engage allied 
forces. This mission was largely assigned to the Air Force and led to unprecedented coordination between the 
Army and Air Force. The ASB Concept is similarly designed to attack-in-depth, but instead of focusing on the land 
domain from the air, the Concept describes integrated operations across all five domains (air, land, sea, space, and 
cyberspace) to create advantage. The ASB Concept further differentiates itself from its predecessor in that the ASB 
Concept also strives to protect our rear echelon across the same domains. This defensive aspect of ASB helps the 
Joint Force reduce risk in the face of increasingly longer range and more precise weapons which could affect our 
space-based platforms, land forces, airbases, capital ships, and network infrastructure. 
While ASB is not a strategy, it is an important component of DoD’s strategic mission to project power and sustain 
operations in the global commons during peacetime or crisis. Implementation of the ASB Concept, coordinated 
through the ASB office, is designed to develop the force over the long-term, and will continue to inform institutional, 
conceptual, and programmatic changes for the Services for years to come. The ASB Concept seeks to provide 
decision makers with a wide range of options to counter aggression from hostile actors. At the low end of the 
conflict spectrum, the Concept enables decision makers to maintain freedom of action, conduct a show of force, 
or conduct limited strikes. At the low end of the conflict spectrum, the Concept enables decision makers to engage 
with partners to assure access, maintain freedom of action, conduct a show of force, or conduct limited strikes. 
At the high end of the conflict spectrum, the Concept preserves the ability to defeat aggression and maintain 
escalation advantage despite the challenges posed by advanced weapons systems. 
The ASB Concept is a limited but critical component in a spectrum of initiatives aimed at shaping the security 
environment. Similar to other concepts, ASB makes important contributions in both peace and war. The improved 
combat capabilities advocated by the concept may help shape the decision calculus of potential aggressors. 
Additionally, continued U.S. investments in the capabilities identified in the concept reassure our allies and partners, 
and demonstrate the U.S. will not retreat from, or submit to, potential aggressors who would otherwise try and 
deny the international community the right to international waters and airspace. When combined with security 
assistance programs and other whole-of-government efforts, the ASB Concept reflects the U.S. commitment to 
maintaining escalation advantage during conflict and sustaining security and prosperity in the global commons.
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11 | INTRODUCTION
The Department of Defense recognizes the need to explore and adopt options that will preserve U.S. ability to project 
power and maintain freedom of action in the global commons. In July 2009, the Secretary of Defense directed the 
Departments of the Navy and the Air Force to address this challenge and to embark on a new operational concept 
called Air-Sea Battle (ASB). Since then, the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force have collaborated in new 
and innovative ways to address the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) military problem set. Then in January 2012, 
the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense introduced new strategic guidance in Sustaining 
U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense that specifically tasked the U.S. military to project 
power despite A2/AD. In Fall 2012, all four of the Services’ Vice Chiefs signed a memorandum of understanding 
establishing a framework to implement the ASB Concept through the development of a joint force capable of 
shaping and exploiting A2/AD environments in order to maintain freedom of action in the global commons, and 
secure operational access to enable concurrent or follow-on joint operations.
What follows is a fuller description of the military problem presented to U.S. and allied forces by A2/AD threats; 
how ASB addresses this problem; ASB’s role in service and joint force development; and how ASB is being 
implemented. This reference is designed to provide an overview of the ASB Concept and what the Services are 
doing to operationalize or implement its tenets within their force development processes. At an unclassified 
level, this summary reference cannot wholly describe the concept or these actions. The original ASB Concept, its 
annexes, and the Fiscal Year 13 Implementation Master Plan (IMP) remain classified as they lay out the specific 
details of how the joint force should be developed to defeat A2/AD threats and how the Services are implementing 
those recommendations. These restricted documents are recommended reading for individuals with the requisite 
clearances and need to know. However, what is presented here is directly adapted from the ASB Concept and the 
FY13 IMP and exactingly represents the core ideas and activities of ASB and its implementation. 
22 | ANTI-ACCESS/AREA DENIAL (A2/AD)
A2/AD capabilities are those which challenge and threaten the ability of U.S. and allied forces to both get to the 
fight and to fight effectively once there. Notably, an adversary can often use the same capability for both A2 and AD 
purposes. It is the effect of A2/AD on U.S. and expeditionary operations that matters.
A2/AD capabilities and strategies to employ them combine to make U.S. power projection increasingly risky, and 
in some cases prohibitive, while enabling near-peer competitors and regional powers to extend their coercive 
strength well beyond their borders. In the most challenging scenarios, the U.S. may be unable to employ forces 
the way it has in the past: build up combat power in an area, perform detailed rehearsals and integration activities, 
and then conduct operations when and where desired. By acquiring these advanced A2/AD technologies, potential 
adversaries are changing the conditions of warfare that the U.S. has become accustomed to in the past half century.
While A2/AD ideas are not new—the desire to deny an adversary both access and the ability to maneuver are 
timeless precepts of warfare—technological advances and proliferation threaten stability by empowering potentially 
aggressive actors with previously unattainable military capabilities. A new generation of cruise, ballistic, air-to-air, 
and surface-to-air missiles with improved range, accuracy, and lethality is being produced and proliferated. Modern 
submarines and fighter aircraft are entering the militaries of many nations, while sea mines are being equipped 
with mobility, discrimination and autonomy. Both space and cyberspace are becoming increasingly important and 
contested. The pervasiveness and advancement of computer technology and reliance on the internet and usable 
networks are creating means and opportunity for computer attack by numerous state and non-state aggressors, and 
the domain of space is now integral to such military capabilities as communications, surveillance, and positioning. 
In certain scenarios, even low-technology capabilities, such as rudimentary sea mines, fast-attack small craft, or 
shorter range artillery and missile systems render transit into and through the commons vulnerable to interdiction 
by coercive, aggressive actors, slowing or stopping free movement. The range and scale of possible effects from 
these capabilities presents a military problem that threatens the U.S. and allied expeditionary warfare model of 
power projection and maneuver.
The A2/AD threat exceeds any single or specific theater of operations, and creates problematic consequences for 
international security. For example, an aggressor can slow deployment of U.S. and allied forces to a theater, prevent 
ANTI-ACCESS (A2)
Action intended to slow deployment of friendly 
forces into a theater or cause forces to operate from 
distances farther from the locus of conflict than 
they would otherwise prefer. A2 affects movement 
to a theater.
AREA-DENIAL (AD)
Action intended to impede friendly operations 
within areas where an adversary cannot or will 
not prevent access. AD affects maneuver within 
a theater.
3coalition operations from desired theater locations, or force friendly forces to operate from disadvantageous longer 
distances. Effectively undermining integrated U.S. and allied operations, the aggressor is likely drive allies and 
partners to seek accommodation with potential aggressors, or to develop alternate means of self-defense with 
potentially destabilizing effects. Such an environment induces instability, erodes the credibility of U.S. deterrence, 
can necessitate escalation in U.S. and allied responses, and weakens U.S. international alliances including 
associated trade, economic, and diplomatic agreements.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Adversary capabilities to deny access and areas to U.S. forces are becoming increasingly advanced and 
adaptive. These A2/AD capabilities challenge U.S. freedom of action by causing U.S. forces to operate with 
higher levels of risk and at greater distance from areas of interest. U.S. forces must maintain freedom of 
action by shaping the A2/AD environment to enable concurrent or follow-on operations.
A concept to address this operational problem must be based on realistic assumptions regarding how an adversary 
will employ A2/AD capabilities. The assumptions that underpin the ASB Concept reflect a conservative view of what 
an adversary could do, and have direct implications for how the U.S. can and should respond.
First, the adversary will initiate military activities with little or no indications or warning. While the adversary may 
signal or threaten in an attempt to deter U.S. or allied actions to maintain access, the adversary gains no advantage 
by telegraphing the commencement of hostilities – and does not need to. Capabilities such as ballistic and cruise 
missiles will be used with little warning, and ambiguous or minimal warning will be received of air and maritime 
deployments. The implications are that a short warning timeline requires the U.S. to maintain ready forces that are 
routinely integrated and prepared to conduct high risk operations against very capable adversaries.
Second, given the lack of indications or warning, forward friendly forces will be in the A2/AD environment at the 
commencement of hostilities. As a result, the steady state posture and capabilities of forces must be able to provide 
an immediate and effective response to adversary A2/AD attacks through high tempo operations in the A2/AD 
environment. Additional forces introduced into the threat environment should be able to promptly integrate into the 
existing force posture. 
Third, adversaries will attack U.S. and allied territory supporting operations against adversary forces. In addition 
to attacking American aircraft, ships, space assets, networks, and people, denying access to U.S. forces requires 
attacks on bases from which U.S. and its allies are operating, including those on allied or partner territory. The 
implication is that the defense of all bases from which U.S. forces operate must be addressed, whether on U.S. or 
partner/allied territory. Even the U.S. homeland cannot be considered a sanctuary, and real-time prioritization may 
be required between homeland defense and overseas operations.
Fourth, all domains will be contested by an adversary – space, cyberspace, air, maritime, and land. Cyberspace 
and space-based capabilities are essential for U.S. operations and are vulnerable to adversary capabilities with a 
4low barrier to entry such as computer network attack and electronic jamming. Since the adversary may employ a 
multi-domain approach, ASB must defend and respond in each warfighting domain.
Lastly, no domain can be completely ceded to the adversary. Each domain can be used to impact and deny access 
to the others, so to cede one domain to an adversary invites the eventual loss of the other interdependent domains. 
While U.S. forces may contest freedom of action in each domain, they are not likely to be required to achieve 
control in each domain simultaneously or to the same degree. As such, U.S. forces must take advantage of freedom 
of action in one domain to create U.S. advantage or challenge an adversary in another. This will require tightly 
coordinated actions across domains using integrated forces able to operate in each domain.
ASB is a limited objective concept that describes what is necessary for the joint force to sufficiently shape A2/AD 
environments to enable concurrent or follow-on power projection operations. The ASB Concept seeks to ensure 
freedom of action in the global commons and is intended to assure allies and deter potential adversaries. ASB is 
a supporting concept to the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), and provides a detailed view of specific 
technological and operational aspects of the overall A2/AD challenge in the global commons. The Concept is not 
an operational plan or strategy for a specific region or adversary. Instead, it is an analysis of the threat and a 
set of classified concepts of operations (CONOPS) describing how to counter and shape A2/AD environments, 
both symmetrically and asymmetrically, and develop an integrated force with the necessary characteristics 
and capabilities to succeed in those environments. ASB is about building conceptual alignment, programmatic 
collaboration and institutional commitment in an integrated way, across the military Services in order to develop 
forces and capabilities that can jointly address A2/AD challenges. The purpose of ASB is not to simply conduct 
operations more jointly. It is to increase operational advantage across all domains, enhance Service capabilities and 
mitigate vulnerabilities. In addition to other joint and service concepts, ASB will help ensure the U.S.’s ability to gain 
and maintain freedom of action in the global commons, and to the conduct of concurrent or follow-on operations 
against a sophisticated adversary. 
Central Idea. The ASB Concept’s solution to the A2/AD challenge in the global commons is to develop networked, 
integrated forces capable of attack-in-depth to disrupt, destroy and defeat adversary forces (NIA/D3). ASB’s 
vision of networked, integrated, and attack-in-depth (NIA) operations requires the application of cross-domain 
operations across all the interdependent warfighting domains (air, maritime, land, space, and cyberspace, to 
disrupt, destroy, and defeat (D3) A2/AD capabilities and provide maximum operational advantage to friendly joint 
and coalition forces.
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5Networked: C2 of Cross-Domain Operations; Enable JFC Control
Integrated: Air, Naval & Land Capabilities Tailored to Missions or Operations
Attack-in-Depth: Project Forces Through Denied Space Zones
Figure 1. Components of ASB’s Conceptual Design ‘NIA/D3’
Multiple LOEs
Conducted in Parallel
Enemy A2/AD 
Strategy & Capabilities
LOE 1: DISRUPT C4ISR networks Result: Gain Decision Advantage
Result: Regain Freedom of Action
Result: Sustain Offensive Operations
LOE 2: DESTROY Enemy Capabilities
LOE 3: DEFEAT Enemy Employed Weapons
Cross-domain operations are conducted by integrating capabilities from multiple interdependent warfighting 
domains to support, shape, or achieve objectives in other domains. Cross-domain operations are those that can 
exploit asymmetric advantages in specific domains to create positive and potentially cascading effects in other 
domains. For cross-domain operations to be fully effective, commanders, whether defending or attacking, must 
have ready access to capabilities, no matter what domain they reside in or which commander owns them, to 
support or achieve operational objectives and create the effects required for advantage over an adversary. This 
interoperability may require multi-pathing, or the ability to use multiple, alternative paths from among all domain 
capabilities to achieve a desired end. While cross-domain operations are more complex than single domain or 
single Service options, their multi-pathing possibilities can provide distinct operational advantages over single 
domain or single Service solutions to operational problems. 
The ability to integrate capabilities, equipment, platforms, and units across multiple domains and to communicate, 
interact, and operate together presents a joint force commander with more numerous and powerful options, which 
in turn, offer greater probability of operational success. For example, cyber or undersea operations can be used 
to defeat air defense systems, air forces can be used to eliminate submarine or mine maritime threats, or space 
assets can be used to disrupt adversary command and control. Put simply, traditional understandings of Service 
missions, functional responsibilities, or employment of capabilities from particular domains should not be barriers 
that hamper imaginative joint operations in an A2/AD environment. Each of the elements of ASB’s construct offer 
joint force commanders increased flexibility and capability.
Networked. In the ASB Concept, networked actions are tightly coordinated in real time by mission-organized forces 
to conduct integrated operations across all domains without being locked into Service-specific procedures, tactics, 
or weapons systems. A networked force is people and equipment linked in time and purpose with interoperable 
6procedures; command control (C2) structures; and appropriate authorities capable of translating information into 
actions. These joint forces are able to attack the adversary A2/AD system-of-systems in depth and across all 
domains to create and exploit vulnerabilities.
Networked capabilities are both the physical means by which forces communicate and exchange information and 
the relationships, protocols, and procedures used by warfighters to complete their assigned missions. To be effective, 
networked forces need interoperable procedures, (C2) structures, and equipment. Authorities must also be provided 
at the appropriate C2 level in order for joint and coalition forces to gain and maintain decision advantage. In the ASB 
Concept, networked does not only mean having assured communications and access to data; it also means having 
a force trained to conduct operations using mission-type orders and being able to operate even in the absence of 
continuous connectivity. The joint force can achieve that ability in part by establishing habitual relationships across 
Service, component, and domain lines so that forces can be effectively trained to operate together in a contested 
and degraded environment.
Integrated. Integration is the arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates 
networked across domains as a whole. An integrated joint force is better able to combine capabilities across 
multiple domains to conduct specific missions. The basic concept of integration has further evolved into seeking the 
development of pre-integrated joint forces. In order to maintain an advantage over potential adversaries, air, naval, 
and land forces must fully integrate their operations. Integration, traditionally viewed as strictly the combatant 
commander’s job, needs to begin across Service lines as part of force development.
Forces should be integrated prior to entering a theater. Effective integration requires enhanced joint and combined 
training against A2/AD capabilities, including training and exercise for cross-domain operations before deployment. 
In some cases, pre-integration will also require Services’ collaboration in materiel programming to ensure 
interoperability to avoid overly redundant or incompatible systems.
Attack-in-depth to Disrupt, Destroy and Defeat. The attack-in-depth methodology is based on adversary 
effects chains, or an adversary’s process of finding, fixing, tracking, targeting, engaging and assessing an attack 
on U.S. forces. Attack-in-depth is offensive and defensive fires, maneuver, and command and control with the 
objective of disrupting, destroying, or defeating an adversary’s A2/AD capabilities, conducted across domains in 
time, space, purpose, and resources. Attack-in-depth seeks to apply both kinetic and non-kinetic means to address 
Air-Sea Battle mitigates access challenges by moving beyond simply de-conflicting operations 
in each war fighting domain, toward creating the level of domain integration necessary to defeat 
increasingly varied and sophisticated threats.
  Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta
     20 February 2012
7adversary critical vulnerabilities without requiring systematic destruction of the enemy’s defenses (e.g., a rollback 
of an adversary’s integrated air defense system).
D3 represents the 3 lines of effort of the ASB Concept: 
•	 Disrupt Adversary Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (C4ISR or C4I); 
•	 Destroy adversary A2/AD platforms and weapons systems; and, 
•	 Defeat adversary employed weapons and formations.
Disrupting these effects chains includes impacting an adversary’s C4ISR or C4I capabilities, ideally precluding 
attack on friendly forces. Destroying or neutralizing adversary weapons platforms enhances friendly survivability 
and provides freedom of action. Defeating employed weapons post-launch defends friendly forces from an 
adversary’s attacks and allows sustained operations.
Due to the nature of A2/AD threats and potentially short indications and warning timelines posed by adversaries, 
joint forces must be capable of effective offensive operations as soon as conflict begins, while simultaneously 
defending or re-positioning deployed forces, protecting land and sea bases, and bringing forces forward from 
garrison with acceptable levels of risk. The ability to attack and defend through the entire depth of the desired 
battlespace, in all the interdependent warfighting domains, is critical to establishing joint freedom of action.
The ASB Concept is focused on joint force development. As a service concept, it falls under the Services’ Title 10 
responsibilities to man, train, and equip forces for employment by the combatant commands. Accordingly, the 
objective of the ASB Concept is to inform force development to ultimately provide combatant commanders’ joint 
forces with the aforementioned NIA-D3 capabilities that will help ensure freedom of access in the global commons. 
The ASB Concept is intended to foster future capabilities that directly support several of the U.S. Armed Forces 
primary missions described in the DoD’s Strategic Guidance (DSG): Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 
21st Century Defense. These include missions to Deter and Defeat Aggression, Project Power Despite Anti-Access/
Area Denial Challenges, and to Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space.
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PRIMARY MISSIONS OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES
•	 Counter Terrorism & Irregular Warfare
•	 Deter & Defeat Aggression
•	 Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges
•	 Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
•	 Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space
•	 Maintain a Safe, Secure, & Effective Nuclear Deterrent
•	 Defend Homeland & Provide Support to Civil Authorities
•	 Provide A Stabilizing Presence
•	 Conduct Stability & Counterinsurgency Operations
•	 Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief & Other Operations
8The ASB Concept is also a supporting concept to and thus complements the overarching Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff’s force development vision detailed in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 
(CCJO), JOAC, and the emerging Joint Concept for Entry Operations (JCEO). As a capstone document, the CCJO 
describes the future operating environment and the high-order vision for how the future force will need to conduct 
Globally Integrated Operations across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO). ASB is aligned with this operating 
environment and several of the key elements required to achieve the Chairman’s vision – specifically concerning 
the need for developing cross-domain synergy in the future force. 
JOAC is a component under the CCJO that broadly describes how U.S. joint forces will overcome opposed 
access challenges. It establishes guiding precepts and capabilities necessary to assure access and for the joint 
forces to overcome A2/AD threats. At the next level, ASB supports JOAC by identifying more specific means and 
requirements by which the joint force may defeat those adversary threats in order to maintain freedom of action 
in the global commons.
JCEO, at the same level as ASB, will focus on guiding force development to enable joint force entry operations 
in an A2/AD environment. ASB can be seen to support JCEO by covering that freedom of action and access 
requirements in the global commons that ultimately support the joint force’s ability to conduct concurrent or 
follow-on entry operations.
Strategy
(DSG)
Joint Operations
(CCJO - JF2020)
Joint Operations Access
(JOAC)
Air-Sea Battle
(ASB)
Entry Operations
(JCEO)
Figure 2. Relationship between Strategy, CCJO, JOAC, JCEO & ASB
Like other joint concepts, ASB does not seek to create a new force, as in one with wholly new equipment or 
capabilities, but instead endeavors to unify Service Title 10 efforts to develop forces that fight together more 
effectively. The Concept is a natural evolution of joint coalition warfighting toward more networked and integrated 
operational employment. It is an example of how the separate Services can formally collaborate, yet still protect, 
develop, and maintain unique Service capabilities, equities, and culture. 
The ASB Concept views the joint force in a holistic way to include doctrine, organization, training, materiel, 
leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) within the Services’ purview to organize, train, and equip. The ASB 
Concept specifically addresses a range of threats, such as ballistic and cruise missiles, sophisticated integrated 
9air defense systems, anti-ship capabilities from high-tech missiles and submarines to low-tech swarming boats, 
electronic warfare, and counter-C4ISR capabilities. Yet, the ASB Concept differs from other concepts because, while 
it contains the operational details needed in a limited objective concept, it is about fostering institutional change, 
conceptual alignment, and materiel change in and among the Services. 
•	 Institutional	 Service	 and	 joint	 cooperation	 is	 enhanced	 through	 enduring	 organizational	 collaboration	
relevant to A2/AD environments as they evolve over time. Over the long term, the Concept envisions 
closer collaboration and integration of the Services’ organize, train, and equip activities across the 
DOTMLPF spectrum. This will be done by expanding integration efforts through collaborative planning 
and increased liaison to emphasize more joint training at the operational and tactical levels.
•	 Conceptual	alignment,	perpetuated	through	the	ASB	conceptual	design,	which	describes	how	capabilities	
and forces are integrated to accomplish combatant commander-directed operational objectives in A2/
AD environments. Conceptual alignment actions fall into three broad categories: concept development, 
wargaming, and experimentation. 
•	 Materiel	 solutions	 and	 innovations	 are	 collaboratively	 developed	 and	 vetted	 to	 ensure	 they	 are	
complementary where appropriate, redundant when mandated by capacity requirements, fully 
interoperable, and fielded with integrated acquisition strategies. ASB advocates for a process with 
expected products with a specific timeline to better facilitate Services’ programmatic collaboration. The 
process is not intended to supplant existing Service activities, but to benefit from those activities and act 
as a focal point for improving inter-Service collaboration.
These key objectives guide the Services’ efforts to develop the networked, integrated forces able to attack and 
defend where and when required—throughout any contested domain. Through these objectives, the Concept strives 
to develop a pre-integrated joint force ready to meet the A2/AD challenges. Such a pre-integrated joint force is built 
from the aforementioned habitual relationships, interoperable and complementary cross-domain capabilities. It 
benefits from realistic, shared training, enhancing the flexibility to develop new tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TTPs) on the fly as operational conditions dictate. Such forces will provide the strategic deterrence assurance and 
stabilizing effects of a force in being and be ready at the outset of a contingency to avoid delays for buildups or 
extensive mission rehearsal. 
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In late 2011, the Secretary of Defense endorsed the ASB Concept 
as a necessary first step to address the anti-access, area denial 
challenge and directed the Services to work further to develop the 
Concept. To this end, the Services established a multi-service, flag-
level ASB Executive Committee (EXCOM), Senior Steering Group 
(SSG), and supporting staff charged with implementing the Concept. 
Composed of representatives from each of the four Services, the 
role of the ASB Office is to foster the development and adoption of 
the related conceptual, institutional and material solutions through 
coherent implementation of the Concept’s NIA/D3 construct. The 
ASB Office advocates for ASB initiatives, monitors their progress, 
and coordinates with various stakeholders within each Service.
The ASB office has established subject matter expert working 
groups and held implementation workshops to further validate, 
refine, and expand the original ASB Concept work as well as 
to lay out a plan for multi-Service implementation. This plan 
describes the recommended processes and actions to develop 
forces and enhance military capabilities necessary to counter 
current and future A2/AD challenges, using 2020 as the objective 
year. Accordingly, ASB is expected to be a multi-year process, as 
advanced capabilities come on line and the Services strengthen 
and enhance their habitual relationships and closely integrate their 
organize, train, and equip actions.
Following are examples of the actions being taken by the Services 
to implement the ASB Concept.
Incorporating contested & denied environments into 
Service training & education. In order to produce forces that 
can operate in, and counter an A2/AD environment, the Services 
must train to an increasingly challenging A2/AD environment and 
more fully integrate tactics, techniques, and procedures across 
service, functional, and domain lines. The Services will incorporate 
contested, degraded operations into their training and education 
programs, from the individual and unit level through integrated 
training in the deployed environment. Required training focus will 
SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF ACTIONS  
BEING TAKEN BY THE SERVICES TO 
IMPLEMENT AIR-SEA BATTLE:
•	 Incorporating contested & denied 
environments into Service training & 
education
•	 Incorporating characteristics of 
contested environments into Service 
and Joint exercises
•	 Continuing subordinate concept 
development in support of CCJO, 
JOAC, and Air-Sea Battle 
•	 Conducting engagement activities 
to ensure conceptual alignment 
with partners, build necessary 
partner capacity, and to strengthen 
relationships to assure access
•	 Conducting various studies and 
experiments to determine the 
validity of specific counter-A2/AD 
capabilities and concepts
•	 Conducting war games to explore 
future structures and policies 
for cross-domain operations 
command and control (XDO C2) and 
experiments to integrate and enable 
XDO C2 at the tactical level in A2/AD 
environments
•	 Developing multi-service tactics, 
techniques & procedures (TTPs) that 
address the A2/AD environment
•	 Conducting Service wargames 
focused on the Air-Sea Battle 
Concept’s application in realistic 
operational scenarios
•	 Collaborating on Service resource 
planning and programming
•	 Incorporating Air-Sea Battle’s and 
counter-A2/AD ideas into Joint and 
Service doctrine
•	 Establish & strengthen habitual 
relationships among Service 
organizations with complementary or 
similar operational purposes
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include both active measures, such as integrating capabilities to neutralize advanced adversary air defenses, and 
passive measures, such as comprehensive emissions control training. Education will include teaching the ASB 
Concept and JOAC precepts and ideas in Service professional military education courses and war colleges.
Incorporating characteristics of contested environments into Service and Joint exercises. The nature of 
heavily defended A2/AD capabilities makes attacking them, either kinetically or non-kinetically, far more challenging. 
Cross-domain solutions are required in order for manned or unmanned weapons systems to be able to penetrate 
and survive in contested environments. Cross-domain and multi-service training will be the focus in both defensive 
and offensive operations. 
Continuing subordinate concept development in support of CCJO, JOAC, and ASB. CCJO, JOAC, and ASB 
have attempted to outline the current and future threat, however the nature of warfare dictates the threat will 
evolve in unpredictable ways. Continued development of the ASB Concept’s ideas, in more detail, will be needed as 
the threat and operational scenarios change. Subordinate or complementary concepts will be developed, both to 
support the operationalization of the ASB Concept and to support the JOAC and the CCJO. 
Conducting engagment activities to build conceptual alignment and partner capacity and to strengthen 
relationships to assure access. Shaping and engagment activities during implementation ensures conceptual 
alignment with our partners and allies, builds necessary partner capacity and stengthens our relationships which 
facilitate and assure access to multiple domains in the event conflict occurs.
Conducting various studies and experiments to determine the validity of specific counter-A2/AD 
capabilities and concepts. Studies and experimentation are critical for the evolution of concepts in to doctrine. 
Continued study and assessment of ASB’s operational solutions will be conducted, as will experimentation into 
innovative capabilities and processes to defeat A2/AD threats and enhance joint integration and interdependence. 
Conducting experiments with integrated command and control of cross-domain operations. Command 
and control is the heart and soul of joint operations; fighting in a multi-domain environment against a capable 
adversary will require innovative methods to ensure decision advantage and operational success. The Services will 
review and better integrate the existing C2 structures to allow for ease of cross-domain operations.
…future Joint Forces will leverage better integration to improve cross-domain synergy—the 
complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities across domains in time and 
space. While the U.S. military maintains unique advantages in every domain, it is our ability to 
project force across domains that so often generates our decisive advantage.
  Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
12
Developing multi-service TTPs that address the A2/AD environment. Current Joint and Service TTPs still 
largely reflect an operational environment where U.S. and coalition operational access is unchallenged. During the 
multi-year implementation process of ASB and JOAC, Service-level and combatant commander-level organizations 
must review, revise, and (in some cases) develop the necessary TTPs based on the results of wargaming, 
experimentation, tactics development, and exercises/cross-domain training events. Joint TTPs are already 
developed collaboratively by the Services; ASB will seek closer, earlier, and more ubiquitous collaboration on how 
best to operate, share information, and train the force to proficiency.
Conducting Service wargames focused on the ASB Concept’s application in realistic operational 
scenarios. Service Title 10 wargames are key shaping events for force development. All four Services will address 
various aspects of the evolving A2/AD environment. They will be informed by and build on each other’s work. This 
will include collaborative support of sister Service wargames with subject matter experts.
Collaborating on Service resource planning and programming. The joint force ultimately ends up with the 
capabilities it invests in; ASB will seek closer integration of resource planning and programming. This will begin 
with mutually developed capability gaps and integrated solution sets; these are followed by collaborated, integrated 
priorities provided to Service resource sponsors and programmers.
Incorporating ASB and counter-A2/AD ideas into Joint and Service doctrine. Once best practices and TTPs 
are validated, the Services will reflect these in their doctrine. This includes reviewing existing doctrine and, where 
applicable, advocating the use of suitable doctrine for emerging and future environments.
Establishing & strengthening habitual relationships among Service organizations with complementary 
or similar operational purposes. The ASB Concept will largely be implemented by the Fleet and Field; encouraging 
and facilitating the establishment of habitual relationships between operational level and tactical level units is 
critical to the long-term success of the ASB Concept’s ideas. This includes Echelon 2 and 3 organizations such as 
the USAF’s Air Combat Command (ACC), the Navy’s Fleet Forces Command (FFC), the Army’s Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC), and the Marine Corps’ Combat Development Command (MCCDC).
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6 | CONCLUSION
Successful implementation of the ASB Concept will require unprecedented levels of joint and combined integration 
founded on comprehensive and habitual relationships that span from the fleets and forces in the field to the 
headquarters’ staffs in the Pentagon. Substantial aspects of joint force development, operations, training, acquisition, 
and modernization will be involved in order to meet the challenge and be ready. Given the proliferation of advanced 
A2/AD technologies, NIA/D3 solutions will be a necessary component for the U.S. military’s ability to continue to 
confidently operate forward and project power throughout the world. The ASB Concept is a natural evolution of the 
joint force and relations with allies toward more networked and integrated operational solutions. In a changing 
world that demands continued U.S. leadership, concepts such as ASB are essential to sustaining America’s military 
freedom of action and ability to project power. 
The reality of force development is that about 80% of Joint Force 2020 is programmed or exists 
today. We do however; have an opportunity to be innovative in two ways. We can significantly 
change the other 20% of the force, and we can change the way we use the entire force. While 
new capabilities will be essential, many of our most important advancements will come through 
innovations in training, education, personnel management, and leadership development.
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